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WASHINGTON
Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Wash., 9 P.3d 892 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (holding the Department of Ecology properly imposed a
combination of conditions that furthered the purposes of the federal
Clean Water Act and Washington's Water Pollution Control Act more
effectively than numeric conditions alone and the numeric limits were
reasonable).
The Department of Ecology ("DOE") issued a wastewater discharge
permit to Tesoro Northwest Co. ("Tesoro") that included a
combination of numeric effluent limits and narrative conditions.
Puget Soundkeeper Alliance ("Soundkeeper") appealed the permit
issuance to the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("PCHB").
Soundkeeper claimed the permit issuance violated state law standards,
which require using all known, available, and reasonable methods of
prevention, control, or treatment ("AKART"). Soundkeeper argued
DOE violated applicable statutes by using a combination of numeric
limits and narrative conditions because only numeric limits satisfied
AKART requirements. PCHB concluded the combination of numeric
discharge limits and the narrative requirements in the permit satisfied
the AKART requirements and upheld the permit.
Soundkeeper claimed the permit failed to comply with
Washington's AKART statutory requirements because AKART
mandated that permits contain only numeric effluent limits. The
court relied on the interpretation of the "all known available and
reasonable" language used in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Southwest Air Pollution
Control Authority in the context of air pollution emission requirements.
The Weyerhaeuser court held that while the statutory language was
clearly meant to foster the use of new emission control technology, it
did not necessarily require using the best control technology. The
Weyerhaeuser court identified two reasons for its holding. First, the
"known" and "available" language did not require applicants to
develop new technology to advance emission controls. Second, the
term "reasonable" limited DOE to require a system that was both
economically and technically feasible. The Weyerhaeuser court also held
the "known, available and reasonable" language did not require DOE
to use only numeric limits. In conjunction with Weyerhaeuser, the court
held that the AKART requirement was to be similarly construed.
AKART neither required applicants to develop new technology nor
limited DOE to numeric conditions on permits.
In addition, Soundkeeper argued Washington's AKART provision
required that the permit's discharge limits disallowed discharges at
higher levels than the actual levels. Because the numeric limits in the
permit were higher than the refinery's actual discharge levels, and the
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narrative conditions could not make up for the discrepancy,
Soundkeeper contended the permit violated the statute. Noting that
the AKART provision required using reasonable "methods" to control
toxicants, the court concluded the permit's conditions, which directly
addressed the refinery's pollution control methods, better satisfied
AKART than numeric limits alone. The court reasoned that the limits
only indirectly related to the pollution control methods. Thus, the
court found the permit both implemented the AKART requirements
and did not violate either the federal Clean Water Act or Washington's
Water Pollution Control Act.
Dawn Watts
WISCONSIN
Danielson v. Sun Prairie, 619 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that (1) a sewage interceptor, by nature of design, was not
subject to Wisconsin law because it was not a part of a sewer system to
which an abutting property owner can connect, and (2) pursuant to
Wisconsin law, a relocation order is not a required first step in the
condemnation process).
Norman Danielson ("Danielson") owned property in the Town of
Burke ("Town"). Danielson brought an action challenging the City of
Sun Prairie's ("City") condemnation of his property in order to obtain
an easement and place a sewer interceptor for the City's sewer system
on his property. Danielson argued both that the City did not obtain
the Town's approval pursuant to Wisconsin law before condemning his
property and that the City did not adopt a relocation order as its first
step in the condemnation process as required under Wisconsin law.
The Town intervened against the City, claiming the City erroneously
did not obtain the Town's approval before constructing the
interceptor. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the City.
Danielson and the Town appealed.
Wisconsin statutory law required the town board's approval when a
joining city proposed to construct and maintain extensions of its sewer
or water system in the town. Further, such approval was subject to the
rights of abutting property owners who were permitted to connect with
Danielson and the Town
and use the sewer or water system.
contended the Wisconsin law referred to any part of a sewer system
within the physical perimeter of the Town. The City maintained the
same law was meant to include only the part of the sewer system that
extended sewer service in town.
The court looked to the statute's plain meaning and determined it
was ambiguous. The court then turned to the statute's legislative
intent. The court concluded the legislative history supported the
statute's construction, which did not include interceptors as extensions

